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SOCIETIES-EFFECT OF SCHISM IN A CHURCH UPON PRO-

HAYES V. MANNING.'-It is generally recognized
that a court has no jurisdiction to pass upon purely ecclesiastical matters,
i.e., where no property rights are involved, such being left exclusively to
When property rights are involved different questions
church tribunals.'
are presented. The Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case
of Watson v. Jones' divided the cases upon this subject into three classes.
The first of these is when the property in controversy is "by the express
terms of the instrument [conveying it] devoted to the teaching, support,
or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or belief." The second
is "when the property is held by a religious congregation which, by the
nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical
associations, and so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty
or obligation to any higher authority." The third is when the congregation holding the property is but a subordinate member of a general church
organization with a supreme judicatory having a general and ultimate
power of control more or less complete. The classification, altho
PERTY OF THE CHURCH.

1.
(1914) 172 S. W. 897.
2. Fussell v. Hail (1908) 233 I. 73, 84 N. E. 43; IMarien v. Evangelical Creed
Congregation (1907) 132 Wis. 650, 113 N. W. 66; 24 L. R. A. N. s. 692.
3. (1871) 13 Wall. 679, 20 L. Ed. 666.

(24)

NOTES

ON RECENT

MISSOURI

CASES

perhaps not logically sound in that the same basis of classification is not
used thruout, is sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this discussion.
In regard to the first of these classes the Supreme Court in Watson
v. Jones said that it was the duty of the court to see that the property was
not diverted from the trust. Altho the task may be a difficult one, it is
the duty of the court to investigate the teachings of the body holding the
property to see that they are not so different from those to which it was
dedicated as to defeat the objects of the trust. It may be that the court
will be aided and influenced by the decision of a church judicatory on
such matters, but the faction which must ultimately prevail must be the
one which represents the original teachings and doctrines even tho the
other faction is recognized by the regular organism of the society as the
lawful successor to the original body. This principle has been frequently
stated but there seems to be no case directly involving the question. If
neither faction taught the doctrines and beliefs to which the property was
dedicated the court might under the doctrine of cy pres give the property
to another organization teaching the original doctrines and beliefs.
In the second class of cases the principles governing voluntary associations apply. 4 If the rule of the congregation is that the majority
governs, the property of the congregation will pass with the majority and
a minority who withdraw can claim no rights in the property. If the
power of control and the government are vested in the officers of the
congregation, the property will be in those who adhere to the regular
organization. The conveyance of the property to the congregation vests
it in the congregation subject to control according to the rules of the
organization. Cases of this class have been before the Supreme Court
of Missouri on several occasions. In Prickett v. Wells,' the proceeding
was in equity to restrain interferences with property conveyed in trust
for the use of the church, by defendant who was chosen pastor by elders
who were not elected according to the rules of the congregation. The
court granted the relief saying that the church could adopt such rules for
the church government as it saw fit and the civil courts would give
effect to them in adjusting claims to the use of church property. In
Fulbright v. Higginbotham,6 the court held that where the deacons of a
church were given authority by the church to control the church property,
they could exclude from use of it any member who refused to recognize
the regular organization. In Turpin v. Bagby,7 the terms of the grant
were that the property was to be "used, kept, maintained, and disposed
of as a place of divine worship for the use of the Ash Grove Baptist Church
* * * while said church shall be governed by#the rules, usages, and faith

of the Missionary Baptist Churches of the State of Missouri." A minority
of the Ash Grove congregation withdrew alleging that the teachings of
4.

Watson v. Jones (1871) 13 Wall. 679, 20 L. Ed. 666.

5.
6.
7.

(1893) 117 Mo. 502, 24 S. W. 52.
(1896) 133 Mo. 668, 34 S. W. 875.
(1897) 138 Mo. 7, 39 S. W. 455.

8

LAW SERIES, MISSOURI BULLETIN

the majority were not in accord with those of the Missionary Baptist
Churches of Missouri and claiming the property on the ground that they
alone of the membership of the congregation taught the faith of the
Missionary Baptist Churches of Missouri. The court held that the power
to appoint trustees was in the congregation and that trustees appointed
by the minority could not take the property "tho they may alone of the
membership truly represent and be governed by the 'rules, usages, and
faith of the Missionary Baptist Churches of the State of Missouri.'
Under a very liberal interpretation of the words of the grant it might
have been found that the conveyance was on trust for the propagation
of the teachings of the Missionary Baptist Churches of Missouri, but the
courts require that the trust be clearly expressed. The words were
perhaps more nearly words of condition which gave to the grantor a right
of re-entry on a diversion of the property from the use of a congregation
teaching the faith of the Missionary Baptist Churches of Missouri. This,
however, would give no support to the claims of either party and was not
raised in the case. The better view is, in accord with the Missouri cases
just discussed, that continuity of organization rather than identity of
doctrine is the criterion, the property being conveyed subject to the rules
8
of the organization and not on a trust to propagate a particular faith.
9
A few jurisdictions require identity of doctrine.
The facts of Watson v. Jones presented a case of the third class.
Because of a protest against the pronouncements of the General Assembly
of the Presbyterian Church of the United States on the subject of slavery
and rebellion and the relation of the church thereto, a schism occurred
in the Presbyterian Church of the United States by which the presbytery
of Louisville was divided. A dispute between the factions of the Louisville
presbytery over church property was taken before the Supreme Court
of the United States in Watson v. Jones. That court decided in favor
of the faction recognized by the General Assembly on the ground that
the action of that body was conclusive upon a civil court. The court
recognized that the question was as to the continuity of the organization
and held that the determination of that question by the church judicatory
was final. Whether the determination of the question by the church
judicatory is final should depend on whether the rules of the church gave
the judicatory authority to pass on that question, the property having been
10
conveyed subject to such rules. In State ex rel. Watson v. Farris,
decided
two years before Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court of Missouri had held
the action of the General Assembly conclusive in determining which of
two factions, created under similar circumstances to those in Watson v.
Jones, should have power to appoint trustees of a college. The case has
8. See the cases collected In the principal case and in 24 L. R. A. N. a. 692, note.
9. Mt. Zion Baptist Church v. Whitmore (1891) 83 Ia. 138,49 N. W. 81; Yanthis v.
Kemp (1908) 43 Ind. App. 203, 85 N. E. 976; Smith v. Pedigo (1893) 145 Ind. 361, 33
N. E. 777, (1896) 44 N. E. 363.
10. (1869) 45 Mo. 183.
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been distinguished from Watson v. Jones and later Missouri cases in that
the charter of the college provided that the trustees should be appointed
by the presbytery "which is connected with the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church of the United States." The opinion of the court,
however, is in accord with Watson v. Jones. In Watson v. Garvin" on
a motion for a rehearing which was passed upon after the decision of
Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court of Missouri refused to recognize the
authority of Watson v. Jones in holding that the decision of the church
judicatory was final in such cases. Adams, J., said that "the civil courts
are presumed to know all the law touching property rights; and if questions
of ecclesiastical law connected with property rights, come before them
they are compelled to decide them. They have no power to abdicate
their own jurisdiction and transfer it to other tribunals." He recognized
that as to questions which are purely ecclesiastical the decision of a
church judicatory is final, civil courts having no jurisdiction in such cases;
but where property rights become involved by a schism, he would seem
to require identity of doctrine. Watson v. Garvin can perhaps be justified
on another ground which was suggested by the court. The General
Assembly cut off the presbytery of St. Louis but did not excommunicate
the members and they are entitled to the use of the church property as
beneficiaries under deeds conveying to the use of the congregation. The
views of the court in Watson v. Garvin were approved in Boyles v. Roberts"
where Graves, J., declared that "there must be identity of doctrines and
faith before a majority of a church organization can take the church
property into another church." At another place he said, "The universal
rule is that where there is a schism in a church, those remaining faithful
to the tenets of the church at the time of the dispute, whether they are in
the majority or the minority, axe entitled to hold the property." In
Russie v. Brazzell, 13 the court compared two confessions of faith to determine whether there was any change which resulted in a diversion of
property held in trust for "The United Brethren in Christ," that church
being subject to the control of higher church organizations. The three
cases last discussed make identity of doctrine the criterion and then
logically require the court to pass on the existence of the identity. A
dictum in Klix v. St. Stanislaus Parish4 made identity of doctrine to be
the criterion but said the court would recognize as conclusive a decision
of a church judicatory on the question. Such a position would be even
more difficult to defend than the position taken in the cases last discussed.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that in cases involving property
of congregational churches, the test is continuity of organization. There
is no reason why a different test should be applied to a church subject to
a higher church authority. When property is conveyed to the local church
11.
12.

(1873) 54 Mo. 353.
(1909) 222 Mo. 613, 121 S. W. 805.

13.

(1895) 128 Mo. 93, 30 S. W. 526.

14.

(1909) 137 Mo. App. 347, 118 S. W. 1171.

4
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in such a case, it is conveyed subject to the rules of the church. If the
control and power of government is vested in a supreme church judicatory
giving it power to determine the legal and regular successor to the original
congregation, its decision should be final, the property being conveyed
subject to the action of such judicatory. As already stated this was the
result of Watson v. Jones and State ex rel. Watson v. Farrisand represents
the weight of authority. In Barkley v. Hayes,' 5 the District Court of the
United States for the western district of Missouri had a similar question
before it and refused to follow Boyles v. Roberts saying it was contrary to
the great weight of authority.
The recent Missouri case of Hayes v. Manning16 arose under a state
of facts essentially the same as in Boyles v. Roberts and the other cases
hereinafter discussed. The cases grew out of the union of the Presbyterian
Church of the United States and the Cumberland Presbyterian Church.
The form of government of the two churches is practically the same.
Each church is composed of local congregations called particular churches
which are immediately governed by church sessions composed of certain
members from the particular churches. Above the sessions are in order,
presbyteries, synods, and the General Assembly which is the highest
authority of the church. The Cumberland Presbyterian Church sprang
from the Presbyterian Church of the United States in the early years of
the nineteenth century. Repeated attempts were made to reunite them.
In 1903 committees reported favorably on the question of union and their
reports were adopted by the General Assembly and presbyteries of each
church. In 1906 the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian
Church formally declared that the union had been established and adjourned sine die. A minority opposed the union and organized another
General Assembly which they contended was the only lawful General
Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church. The schism extended
thru the lower bodies of the church and resulted in contests as to the right
to use the church property. In all the courts where cases were presented,
except in Tennesseel7 and in Missouri"8 , the claim of the Presbyterian
Church of the United States was sustained. The Indiana Appellate Court
in Ransay v. Hicks' 9 also decided in favor of the Cumberland Presbyterian
Church but the decision was reversed when the case was taken before the
Supreme Court of Indiana."0 In the Tennessee case of Landrith v.
Hudgins and in Boyles v. Roberts the courts base their decisions on two
general grounds. The first is that the confessions of faith of the Presbyterian Church of the United States are materially different from those of
the Cumberland Presbyterian Church and that the passage of the property
of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church to the Presbyterian Church of
15.
16.
17.

18.

19.
20.

(1913) 208 Fed. 319.
(1914) 172 S. W. 897.
Landrith v. Hodgins (1907) 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S. W. 783.

In Watson v. Garvin and Boyles v. Roberts.
(1909) 44 Ind. App. 490, 87N. E. 1091.
Ransay v. Hicks (1910) 174 Ind. 428, 91 N. E. 344.
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the United States depends on identity of doctrine and faith. The second
is that the union was not brought about in accordance with the constitution of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church. As to the first it has
already been pointed out that continuity of organization and not identity
of doctrine is the criterion. The second depends on the facts of the
case and involves a study and construction of the constitution of the
Cumberland Presbyterian Church which is beyond the scope of this discussion. It is sufficient to point out that in only three cases2 1 of the numerous ones involving the question has the contention been sustained that
the union was not brought about in accordance with the constitution
of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church. The principal case of Hayes v.
Manning held, in accord with the weight of authority and sound principle,
that continuity of organization was the test and that the union was in
accordance with the constitution of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church.
The court as an additional reason for its decision held that the minority
who represented the Cumberland Presbyterian Church were estopped to
set up their claim because they had acquiesced in the union for six months
and taken a part in church affairs. The reasoning of the court on this
point seems unsound. If the property was held in trust for the minority,
nothing short of acquiescence for the period required by the statute of
limitations should operate to transfer that right to the majority.
From the foregoing observations, it would seem that while the
Supreme Court of Missouri had early laid down the correct principle
involved in these cases, it had departed from its early ruling; and that the
recent case of Hayes v. Manning re-establishes the early decision and
leaves the law in this state in accord with the great weight of authority in
requiring continuity of organization rather than identity of doctrine.
K. B.
CARRIERS-RELATION

1

OF CARRIER

AND

PASSENGER.

BLEDSOE V.

WEsT. -The

duties and liabilities imposed upon a carrier as to persons
who are neither passengers nor employees are determined by the social
obligation established in the common law that every person must so
conduct his own affairs as not to injure or prejudice the rights of another.
These duties are the basis for what may be called non-passenger rights.
Hence, a person who is improperly refused permission to become a passenger has an action against the carrier. 2 This action is based upon a violation of the right to become a passenger and not upon the right of a passenger. In Winscott v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co.,5 the plaintiff was at
the station to meet an incoming passenger; while on the platform he rested
21. Landrith v. Hodgins (1907) 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S. W. 783; Boyles v. Roberts
(1909) 222 Mo. 613, 121 S. W. 805; Ramsay v. Hticks (1909) 44 Ind. App. 490, 87 N. E.
1091.
1.

2.
3.

(1914) 171 S. W.

622.

Harrisv. Stevens (1858) 31 Vt. 79.
(1910) 151 Mo. App. 378, 131 S. W. 749.
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his hands upon the top board of the platform fence which was in a defective
condition; the fence gave way, resulting in injury to the plaintiff: the
court said that the plaintiff was neither a trespasser nor a mere licensee,
but that "a person has a right to go on station premises for the purposes
of escorting an outgoing passenger, or of meeting one whose arrival is
expected. To such person the company does not owe the extraordinary
care it owes a passenger, but it does owe him the duty of ordinary care,
to maintain its station buildings and platforms in a reasonably safe condition for such purposes." So where a person goes upon a car with the
knowledge of the carrier to assist a passenger to board or to alight, tho
he is not a passenger he is performing a service in the common interest of
the carrier and the passenger. It may well be held that his entry is upon
an implied invitation which entitles him to demand ordinary care of the
carrier. 4 Such rights as these, like the rights of persons who intend to
become passengers, are incidental to the business of the carrier and derive
their existence from actual or contemplated passenger rights.
Since a carrier is engaged in a public undertaking and "holds itself
out as ready to receive as passengers all persons who present themselves
in a proper condition, and in a proper manner, and at a proper place to be
carried," 5 its responsibility as a carrier should properly begin upon the
acceptance of the person who thus becomes a passenger. Thus it is conceived that the relation of carrier and passenger does not arise until there
has been an offer to become a passenger and an acceptance of this offer
by the carrier. This acceptance may be express, or it may be implied
from an exact compliance with the terms of the carrier's offer. In Lewis
v. Houston Electric Co., 6 the plaintiff desiring to become a passenger on
a car signalled the motorman who checked its speed. The plaintiff was
injured in an attempt to board the car while it was in motion. Here the
signal to the motorman was considered as the offer and the checking of
the car as the acceptance which created the relation of carrier and passenger. It is often stated that the relation is contractual, expressly or impliedly. 7 The fact that a person goes aboard the vehicle of the carrier
with the knowledge and consent of the one in charge is usually held to
create a contract by operation of law. There is, however, no contract
in fact for the cases hold that the payment of fare which would constitute
the consideration for such contract is not essential.8 Thus, in Reynolds
v. St. Louis Transit Co., 9 there was no evidence that the plaintiff paid any
4. Doss v. Missouri, etc. R. R. Co. (1875) 59 Mo. 27; Bond v. Chicago, etc. R. R.
Co. (1906) 122 Mo. App. 207. 99 S. W. 30.
5.
Webster v. Fitchburg R. R. Co. (1894) 161 Mass. 298, 37 N. E. 165.
6. (1905) 39 Tex. Civ. App. 625, 88 S. W. 489; MeDonough v. Met. R. B. Co.
(1884) 137 Mass. 210.

7. Schepers v. Union Depot Railroad Co. (1894) 126 Mo. 665, 29 S. E. 712;
Schaefer v. St. Louis & Suburban Railway Co. (1895) 128 Mo. 64, 30 S.W. 331; Reynolds v. S'. Louis Transit Co. (1905) 189 Mo. 408, 88 S. W. 50. See O'Donnell v.
Kansas City, St. L. etc. R. R. Co. (1906) 197 Mo. 110, 95 S. W. 196.
8. Buck v. People'sStreet Ry., etc. Co. (1891) 108 Mo. 179, 18S. W. 1090; Albin V.
C. B. I. & P. R. R. Co. (1903) 103 Mo. App. 308, 77 S. W. 153.
9.
(1905) 189 Mo. 408, 88 S. W. 50.
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fare or that fare was demanded. The court said that "if he was received
in the vehicle of a public carrier and was being carried in the manner of
a passenger at the time the accident occurred, and nothing else appears,
those facts are sufficient to support the inference that he was there under
the implied contract that created the relation of passenger and carrier
between him and the company." While it was stated that the relation
of passenger and carrier grows out of contract either express or implied,
it seems that the decision amounts simply to a recognition of the relation
as consensual, treating the act of the plaintiff in offering himself as a
passenger and the acceptance of him by the carrier as such, as sufficient
to create the relation. When the relation is once established the duties
and liabilities with which the carrier is charged are based upon considerations of public policy.
There is a class of persons to whom no duty is owed except to abstain
from wilfully or wantonly injuring them. That is to say, there is no
affirmative duty of care and such persons must take the premises as they
find them. Thus, a carrier may decline to receive on its premises a person
who desires shelter merely and it has been held that a railroad company
is not bound to keep its station open after the last train has left in order
to shelter a passenger who having missed the train is waiting for a street
car.' 0 Similarly, one who steals a ride on a vehicle of the carrier is not
regarded as a passenger and the carrier owes him no duty of care, tho
of course it must refrain from inflicting wilful injury. 1 ' It is only in so far
as the interest of the passenger requires it, that service can be demanded.
So a carrier owes no duty to one who comes to a station out of curiosity.
Thus where the person injured had come to the station in order to see the
President of the United States who was a passenger on the train, the court
said that "the plaintiff was on the spot merely to enjoy himself, to gratify
his curiosity, or to give vent
to his patriotic feeling. The defendant had
12
nothing to do with that."'
The relation having once commenced will ordinarily continue until the
passenger has reached his destination, yet it may be terminated by the
wrongful act of the passenger such as a failure to comply with the reasonable regulations of the carrier,' 3 or by disorderly conduct. 14 It may
also be terminated by the voluntary act of the passenger in leaving the
vehicle of the carrier. If the relation is consensual it would seem to be
properly terminated when such facts appear as would constitute an
intention to terminate the relation on the part of the passenger and an
acquiescence on the part of the carrier. Thus in a recent Missouri case15
where a passenger left the chair car and went into another car which
required the payment of additional fare which was not paid by him, the
10. Heinlein v. Boston & P. R. R. (1888) 147 Mass. 136.
11. Farberv. Mo. Pac. ly.Co. (1893) 116 Mo. 81, 22 S. W. 631; Feeback v. Mo.
Pac.R .Co. (1902) 167 Mo. 206, 66 S. W. 965.
12. Gillis
v. Pennsylvania R?. R. Co. (1868) 59 Pa. 129.
13. Martin v. Rhode Island Co. (1905) 32 R. 1. 162, 78 At]. 548.
14. Smith v. Louisville, etc.
R. R. Co. (1893) 95 Ky. 11, 23 S.W. 652.
15. Siegel v. Illinois Central R. R. Co. (Mo., 1915) 172 S. W. 420.
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court held that he was still a passenger. This case may be placed on the
ground that permission to ride by the one in charge of the conveyance
16
In
without paying fare creates the relation of passenger and carrier.
17
Burbridge v. K. C. Cable Ry. Co., where the plaintiff was injured by one
of the defendant's trains after he had alighted, the court said that the
plaintiff having been a passenger continued as such to the extent that
on leaving the train he was entitled to protection against the negligent
movement of the train: such liability may be put upon the failure to keep
the premises in a safe condition rather than upon the violation of a right
of the passenger. In O'Brien v. St. Louis Transit Co.,'1 where the propriety of certain instructions given at the request of the defendant was
questioned, it was said obiter that "if after striking the conductor the man
was trying to get off the car and the conductor was holding and beating
him and thus followed him to the sidewalk and killed him the company
would be liable." Such a liability may be put upon the ground of respon9
deat superior in the law of agency. 1
In the recent case of Bledsoe v. West 20 the plaintiff went to the station
of the defendant to purchase a ticket. The agent refused to return his
change and upon being requested to do so struck the plaintilff with a metal
stamp. The court held that the act of the agent in selling the ticket was
within the scope of his employment and that "if as an incident thereto
21
It
and as a result thereof, he committed a tort the master is liable."
was also stated that "the plaintiff became a passenger when he went to
the depot to take passage on the defendant's train and therefore the defendant owed him the duty of protecting him from unlawful assaults by
The plaintiff here was in the relation of a
strangers and its employees."
customer to the carrier, upon the premises at the implied invitation of the
carrier, and was entitled to demand ordinary care. The cases have
failed to properly distinguish the duties of a carrier to persons upon the
premises as passengers not being actually transported, to persons in the
relation of customers, and to persons as passengers during actual transportation. The Missouri cases apply the rule that a carrier is charged
with a high duty in the actual transportation of the passenger and that
this duty of exercising extraordinary care devolves upon the2 2carrier with
respect to the safety of passengers getting on and off its cars.
In many of the cases in which the relation of carrier and passenger
is said to exist, the result reached can be made to depend on facts which
form a basis for liability independently of such a relation. It is submitted
that the principal case should be so explained.
R. BURNS.
16.
17.
18.

Drogmund v. MetropolitanSt. Ry. (1906) 122 Mo. App. 154, 98 S. W. 1091.
(1889) 36 Mo. App. 669.
(1904) 185 Mo. 263, 84 S.W. 939.

8 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 33.
(1914) 171 S. W. 622.
Accord, Winston v. Lusk (Mo. 1914) 172 S.W. 76.
22. O'Brien v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1904) 185 Mo. 263, 84 S. W. 939; Reardon v.
St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Co. (1908) 215 Mo. 105, 114 S.W. 961.
19.

20.
21.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT.
UCTS MANUFACTURING

Co.

v.

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN

EXCELSIOR PRODRAILWAY

1

CO. -

While the liability of the master for acts performed by a servant within
the scope of his employment has become well established, the application
of the rule to particular situations presents a very troublesome problem.
From the numerous adjudications the only deducible rule is that the
"scope of the employment" includes all acts which are incident to, or
naturally, proximately and causally related to the work which the servant
is employed to do. This relation between the employment and the act
done is the test of the master's liability rather than the questions as to
whether the servant intended to benefit the master, whether his master's
directions as to the means or manner of performing the service were complied with, or whether the act was done within the period or at the place
of employment. 2
The recent case of Excelsior Products Manufacturing Co. v. Kansas

City Southern Railway Co. calls for the application of the foregoing principles. Laborers, employed by the defendant company in the construction of a subway and living in bunk cars provided by the company, built
a fire upon the right of way and permitted it to spread and to damage the
plaintiff's factory. The laborers, who were off duty at the time, built
the fire for the purpose of drying their clothes. Their duties included only
their work upon the subway and outside of the time they were so engaged
they were free to come and go as they pleased. Unde17 this state of facts,
the court held that the workmen, in kindling the fire, were acting without
the scope of their employment and recovery was therefore denied.
The case presents three questions with reference to the scope of employment: first, is the fact that the servants were off duty when the negligence occurred decisive of the master's non-liability? Second, has the
fact that the workmen lived upon the right of way in cars provided by the
master any bearing upon "the scope of employment?" Third, may the
washing of clothes be considered as an incident to the employment, so
as to render the master liable for the servant's kindling of the fire for that
purpose?
It may be stated as a general rule that the master is not liable for an
act committed by a servant while at liberty from the service and pursuing
his own ends exclusively. 3 A servant may have certain duties to perform
for the master outside of the regular period of employment, however, and
for a default in the commission of such duties the master is liable. Where
an employee of a railway company, when off duty and engaged primarily in
his own pursuits, negligently left a gate open, the company was held
.iable, it appearing that it was the duty of the employee at all times to
1.
(1914) 172 S. W. 359.
2.
Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) §§ 1874-1884.
3.
6 Labatt, Master and Servant (2d ed.) § 2283; Garretson v. Duenckel (1872)
50 Mo. 104; Cousins v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co. (1877) 66 Mo. 576: Long v.
Nute (1906) 123 Mo. App. 204, 100 S. W. 511.
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give attention to anything that he saw amiss. 4 In the principal case, the
workmen bad no duty whatever to perform in addition to their regular
day's work, and their act of building the fire was not within the scope of
their employment unless the matters embraced within the last two questions mentioned above alter the situation.
May it be said that the railroad company, by providing the laborers
with bunk cars and allowing them the use of the right of way for carrying
on the ordinary processes of living with a view to facilitating the performance of the work, broadens the scope of the laborers' employment and
brings within it all acts incidental to the ordinary processes of living? In
Southern Railway Co. v. Power Fuel Co., 5 it was held that a member of
a construction gang of a railroad, who after his day's work was over had
returned to a car provided by the company for that purpose to sleep, was
not an employee so as to make the company liable for a fire originating
thru his negligence. The court declared that he was performing no
business of his employer but was simply making use of facilities allowed
him by his employer for his own purposes. The case seems properly decided and its reasoning applies to the principal case. The liability of the
company as master should not be affected by its having permitted the
servants to live upon the right of way. Conceivably the opposite conclusion might be reached, were the laborers required to occupy the quarters
provided by the company. Whether the company would be held liable
in the principal case for a nuisance or for negligence in placing the cars
where they did, is another matter not in tended to be dealt with here.
It seems, then, that in the principal case recovery can be had against
the master, if at all, only upon the ground that the act of the workmen
was "incidental" to the employment. Some courts, particularly the
English, have been inclined to hold the master responsible for acts which
are incidental to the employment in the sense that while performed by
the servant for primarily personal purposes, they are necessitated by the
physical wants and conveniences of the servant arising out of the service.
A suggestion of such a class of cases was first made in the English case of
Stevens v. Woodward.' A clerk, when leaving work, went into his master's
lavatory to wash his hands and negligently left the water running. The
clerks were provided with a room for washing their hands and were
expressly forbidden to use the master's lavatory. The liability of the
master for the clerk's negligence was denied, but the decision turned upon
the presence of the element of trespass and it was taken for granted that
the master would have been responsible had the negligence occurred in
connection with the lavatory provided for the clerks. This implication
was confirmed in Ruddiman v. Smith 7 where, under facts distinguishable
from those of Stevens v. Woodward only by the absence of the element of
4.
5.
6.
7.

Chapman v. New York Central R. R. Co. (1865) 33 N. Y 369.
(1907) 152 Fed. 917, 82 C. C. A. 65.
(1881) 6 Q. B. D. 318.
(1889) 60 L. T. N. s. 708.
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Lord Coleridge expressly
trespass, the master was held responsible.
drew a distinction between acts which are within the scope of employment
strictly speaking and those which are incident to the employment, and
decided that while it may not have been within the scope of the clerk's
employment to wash his hands, it was clearly an incident to the employment. The only suggestion as to the content of the field of "incidents"
is to be found in his further statement: "In such houses there is generally
some place for the clerks to hang up their coats, some place to hang their
hats, and a lavatory, and so on; all these things are incident to the employment * * *."
A review of American cases discloses little inclination on the part of
the courts to extend the master's liability so as to include personal acts
having an incidental connection with the employment. In Hopkins v.
Western Pacific R. R. Co.,' the court denied the master's liability for a
nuisance created by its servants in using a culvert under the railway near
the plaintiff's house for the purposes of a privy. In the celebrated Minnesota case of Morier v. St. Paul,etc. Ry. Co.,' section men engaged in repairing the track built a fire upon the right of way while off duty during the
noon hour for the purpose of warming their coffee. In so doing they were,
according to the court, acting without the scope of their employment in
the pursuit o their own ends exclusively and the railway company was
held not liable. While this decision has met frequent criticism because of
the court's refusal to take judicial notice that the duties of section men
included keeping the track clear of fires, its authority upon the point of
chief importance in this connection seems never to have been questioned.
10
In Walton v. N. Y. C. Sleeping Car Co., a sleeping car porter, who was
allowed to keep articles of his own personal property in the car, threw from
the car a bundle containing his personal effects and injured a bystander.
This act was held not to be imputable to the master. In McLaughlin v.
Cloquet Tie Co., 11 servants engaged in driving a raft downstream were
obliged to wade into the stream to cut out a stump which impeded their
progress. They then kindled a fire upon the bank for the purpose of
The court held that in so doing they did not, as
drying their clothes.
a matter of law, depart from the course of their employment.
While the decided cases involving the point under discussion are few,
numerous situations may be supposed where a personal act of a servant
might with some show of reason and without opposing the current of authority be imputable to the master. Where the act with respect to which
negligence is charged is done in satisfying a physical want arising out of the
service, the master's responsibility might be supported upbn the ground
that the satisfaction of such a need was essential to the performance of the
work entrusted to the servant and hence within the scope of the employ8. (1875) 50 Cal. 190.
9. (1884) 31 Minn. 351, 17 N. W. 952.
10. (1885) 139 Mass. 556.
11. (1912) 119 Minn. 454, 138 N. W. 434.
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ment. As an example, suppose the servant is entrusted with work of
such a nature that a satisfaction of thirst or hunger during the period of
employment becomes essential to the continuance of the work. The
servant goes upon neighboring land for the purpose of satisfying his desire
and in so doing is guilty of negligence. In such a case the servant might
be considered as acting within the course of his employment, tho such a
view is probably opposed to Hopkins v. Western Pacific R. R. Co., mentioned
above. Probably a better view is, however, that the master's liability
would have to be based, if at all, upon the personal negligence of the master
in failing to provide conveniences rather than upon the imputed negligence
of the servant. In cases where the servant is required to do certain
personal acts preparatory to beginning work, it seems that the master's
liability might be plausibly urged. For instance, suppose an elevator
boy, who is required by his employer to wear a certain uniform is negligent
in changing his ordinary clothes for the required livery, preparatory to
going on duty. Perhaps the master should be held responsible since the
act with respect to which negligence occurred was required by and made
a part of the service. As stated in the beginning, the test as to the scope
of employment should be whether the given act has a direct, proximate
and causal connection with the service entrusted to the servant. Some
acts, tho done with a primarily personal end in view, may nevertheless
satisfy this requirement and for such acts the master should be held
responsible.
In the principal ease, however, it seems that in no view of the situation can the act of the servants in kindling a fire for the purpose of washing
their clothes be said to have such a relation to the employment as to
fasten liability upon the master, and the conclusion seems entirely proper
that there was no liability.
D. H. L.
DISCRIMINATION IN RAILROAD RATES FOR MILITIA.

STATE

EX

REL.

BARKER V. M. K. & T. RY. Co. '-A Missouri statute2 provides that whenever it shall be necessary for the organized militia of the state to travel on
any railroad between points wholly within the state, on military duty
ordered by the Governor, the rate charged shall not exceed one cent per
mile for each man. The constitutionality of the statute was attacked in
State v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co.,3 and it was held that the provision of the
Missouri Constitution 4 requiring the General Assembly to pass laws to
prevent unjust discrimination in the rates of tariffs on the different railroads in the state, renders the statute unconstitutional since the converse
of the requirement forbids the legislature to pass any law which will effect
an unjust discrimination.
1.

(1914) 172 S. W. 35.

2.

Revised Statutes 1909, § 8396.

3.
4.

(1914) 172 S. W. 35.
Constitution of 1875, Art. 12, § 14.
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That the statute effected a discrimination in that it favored one class
of persons over others is plain. Whether that discrimination was proper
depends upon whether "the difference in rates is based upon a reasonable
and fair difference in conditions which equitably and logically justify a
different rate." 5 Whether the discrimination was unjust in that the
rate was confiscatory, depends upon the effect upon the railroads' earnings. The Missouri court held that there was not a proper basis for the
discrimination and that it was also unjust because not a reasonable rate.
In the Minnesota case of State v. C. M. & S. P. Ry. Ce., 6 a statute
similar to the Missouri statute was involved. Minnesota has no such
constitutional provision as Missouri has, and the ground of attack was
that the statute violated the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States in that it was a denial of equal protection of the law.
There was an express waiver of inadequacy of compensation as a ground of
unconstitutionality. It was held that there was a proper basis for the
classification. It was said that it has been considered expedient to organize and make effective state militia, that the men constituting this
force must be assembled for instruction, that the very existence of the state
or nation may depend upon the efficiency of this force which must of
necessity be transported by the railroads in the state; that all these things
serve to place such troops in a class by themselves. In the Kansas case of
In re Gardner,7 it was contended that a one-cent militia fare statute violated
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Relative to the basis for classification the court said: "The times when
members of the National Guard will travel are as uncertain as for other
people. The number who will travel at any particular time is indefinite.
They occupy the same space and have the same privileges as other persons." The Kansas court concluded that there were no circumstances
to distinguish the militia from the general public and that the classification was without a proper basis. The Missouri court in State v. M. K. &
T.Ry. Co. concurred in the view of the Kansas court on that point.
The Minnesota court relied upon Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,' in
which it was held that a discrimination in gas rates in favor of a municipality was not illegal. The Kansas court relied chiefly upon Lake Shore
Ry.Co. v. Smith,' which held that a Michigan statute requiring railroads
to furnish thousand-mile tickets to passengers at a reduced rate, took
the property of the railroad without due process of law and failed to
afford to the railroads equal protection of the law. 10 The Minnesota
5. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Ry. Co. (1897) 168 U. S. 144;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co. (1907) 209 U. S. 108; Commonwealth v. Interstate Street Ry. Co. (1905) 187 Mass. 436, 73 N. E. 530, 11 L. R. A.
N. s.973.

6. (1914) 118 Minn. 380, 137 N. W. 2, 41 L. R. A. N. s.524.
7. (1911) 84 Kansas 264, 113 Pac. 1054, 33 L. R. A. N. s. 956.
8. (1908) 212 U. S. 19, 48 L. R. A. N. s.1134.
9. (1898) 173 U. S. 684.
10. The decision in Lake Shore Hy.Co. v. Smith has been followed in other states:
Beardsley v. Railroad Co. (1900) 162 N. Y. 230, 56 N. E. 488; State v. Great Northern
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court thought Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Smith not in point because the
Michigan Legislature had given a reduction to all who were willing to
pay for a thousand-mile ticket, which created an uncertainty in the
earnings of the railroads so that the maximum rate established might be
too low and hence confiscatory of the carrier's property.
Besides holding the classification improper the Missouri court in
State v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. also held the discrimination unjust on the
ground that if two cents per mile per passenger as fixed by statute"l
in 1907 was a reasonable maximum rate then, in the absence of some
change in conditions one cent per mile per passenger was not reasonable
in 1909 when the statute in question was passed, and is not now. Such
reasoning is open to the objection that the rate of two cents per mile
established in 1907 was a reasonable maximum rate and that in the absence
of evidence it is not to be presumed that one cent per mile would be unreasonable. Granting that it is unreasonable, the decision is not inconsistent with the decisions in other states.
L. W.
CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSONS.

BOONE COUNTY

LUMBER CO. v. NEIDERMEYER.'-Diversity exists in common law jurisdictions as to the right of a beneficiary of a contract to sue on it. The
term beneficiary in this connection has come to have a technical meaning,
referring to one for whose benefit a contract to which he is not a party
is made, who is not a promissee and who advances no consideration.
Contracts from which persons not parties thereto receive benefit may be
grouped under three heads. The first comprises those contracts wherein
the third person was not considered nor intended to be benefited, but
from which he would derive some advantage if the contract were carried
out; e.g., A contracts with B to make an improvement on B's lot which
would ultimately increase the value of C's lot. C is an incidental
beneficiary and cannot maintain an action on the contract in any jurisdiction.1 A second class of cases comprises those in which a contract is made
for the benefit of some third person to whom neither party has any obligation; such a third person is called a gift beneficiary. In the third type
the contract is for the benefit of one to whom the promisee owes a legal
obligation, the third person being called a payment beneficiary. In
England it is now well settled that beneficiaries of a contract have no
right of action at common law. 3 In the United States the contrary is
Ry. Co. (1908) 17 N. D. 370, 116 N. W. 89; Commonwealth v. Atlantic Coast fly. Co.
(1906) 106 Va. 61, .55 S. E. 572, 7 L. R. A. N. s. 1086.
11.
Revised Statutes 1909, § 3232.
1.
(1915) 173 S. W. 57.
2.
Jones v. Miller (1849) 12 Mo. 408; Gordon v. Livingston (1882) 12 Mo. App.
267; Lampert v. Laclede Gaslight Co. (1883) 14 Mo. App. 376; Mann v. Chicago, etc. fly.
Co. (1885) 86 Mo. 347; St. Louis Packet Co. v. Mo.P. ly. Co. (1889) 35 Mo. App.
272; Roddy v. Mo. P. fly. Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 234, 15 S. W. 112; Porter v. Woods
(1897) 138 Mo. 539, 39 S. W. 794.
Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Prather (1898) 65 Ark. 27,
44 S. W. 218; Burton v. Larkin (1887) 36 Kan. 246.
3. Gurrin v. Kopera (1865) 3 H. & G. 694; Dashwood v. Jermyn (1879) 12 Ch.
D. 776; Re Rotherham Alum Co. (1883) 25 Ch. D. 103; Lilly v. Hays (1836) 5 A. & E.
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held in almost all jurisdictions. 4 A few states refuse to allow a payment
beneficiary to recover, 5 and in some states no recovery is allowed the gift
beneficiary. 6
The Missouri courts make no distinction between the gift and payment beneficiary types of contracts. Recovery is allowed in both8
cases.7 A few decisions to the contrary must be regarded as overruled.
There are some cases which appear to be exceptions to the rule, but they
may be distinguished on the ground that there was no intent to benefit
the plaintiff.9 An early case' 0 contained dicta to the effect that if the contract was under seal the beneficiary could not recover thereon unless he
was a party to the deed. The more recent decisions both in Missouri
and other jurisdictions make no distinction between sealed and unsealed
agreements."
As private seals have been generally abolished by statute,
this question is of very little importance today.12
In applying the rule allowing a third person to sue upon a contract
entered into for his benefit, no distinction is made between written and
oral contracts. The cases are uniform in holding that an agreement be548; Gresty v. Gibson (1886) 1 Exch. 112; Evans v. Hooper (1875) 1 Q. B. D. 45; Price
v. Easton t1833) 4 B. & Ad. 433; Tweedle v. Atkinson (1861) 1 B. &S. 393.
4. A abama Dev. Co. v. Short (1898) 1l Ala. 333, 13 So. 385; Starbirdv. Cranston
(1897) 24 Colo. 20, 48 Pac. 657; Brenner v. Luth (1882) 28 Kans. 581; Blakely v. Adams
(1902) 113 Ky. 392. 68 S. W. 393; Michaud v. Erickson (1909) 108 Minn. 356. 12Z
N. W. 324; Etscherd v. Baker (1901) 112 Wis. 129, 88 N. W. 52.
5. Morgan v. Randolph-Clowes Co. (1900) 73 Conn. 396, 47 Atl. 658; White v.
Mt. Pleasant Mills (1899) 172 Mass. 462, 52 N. E. 632; Hand v. Evans Marble Co.
(1898) 88 Md. 226, 50 Ad. 899; Bliss v. Plummer's Estate (1894) 103 Mich. 181, 61
N. W. 263; Hunt v. Fire Association (1895) 68 N. H. 305, 38 Al. 145; Woodcock v.
Bostic (1896) 118 N. C. 822, 24 S. E. 362; Delp v. Brewing Co. (1888) 123 Pa. 42, 15
Al. 871; Nail. Bank v. Grand Loage (1878) 98 U. S. 123.
6. Baxter v. Camp. (1898) 71 Conn. 245, 41 Atl. 803; Marston v. Bigelow (1889)
150 Mass. 45, 22 N. E. 71; Linneman v. Moross (1893) 98 Mich. 178, 57 N. W. 103;
Jefferson v. Asch (1893) 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. W. 604; Curry v. Rogers (1850) 21 N. H.
247; Hostetter v. Hollinger (1888) 117 Pa. 606, 12 Al. 741; Fugure v. Mut. Soc. (1874)
46 Vt. 360; Land Co. v. Newberry (1897) 95 Va. 111, 27 S. E. 897; Shoe Co. v. Dancel
(1903) 119 Fed. 692.
7. Payment Beneficiary: Doane v. Newman (1864) 10 Mo. 70; Corl v. Riggs
(1849) 12 Mo. 430; Rogers v. Gosnell (1875) 58 Mo. 589; Buffalo Forge Co. v. Cullen
Mfg. Co. (1904) 105 Mo. App. 484, 79 S. W. 1024; Dvis v. Dunn (1906) 121 Mo. App
490, 96 S. W. 226; Beattie Mfg. Co. v. Clark (1907) 208 Mo. 89, 106 S. W. 29; Atkinson
v. Hardy (1908) 128 Mo. App. 349, 107 S. W. 466; St. Louis Lumber Co. v. Banks
(1909) 136 Mo. App. 44, 117 S. W. 611; Leckie v. Bennett (1911) 160 Mo. App. 145,
141 S. W. 706; O'Connell v. Trust Co. (1912) 165 Mo. App. 398, 147 S. W. 841; Gate
City Bank v. Chick (1913) 170 Mo. App. 343, 156 S. W. 743; Ulrich v. Globe Surety Co.
Mo., 1914) 166 S. W. 845; Boone County Lumber Co. v. Niedermeyer (Mo. 1915) 173
S. W. 57.
Gift Beneficiary: Weinreich v. Weinreich (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364; Market v.
W. U. Telegraph Co. (1886) 19 Mo. App. 80; Barbarov. Occidental Grove (1877) 4 Mo.
App. 429; St. Louis v. Von Phul (1895) 133 Mo. 561, 34 S. W. 843; Devers v. Howard
(1898) 144 Mo. 671, 46 S. W. 645; Crone v. Stinde (1900) 156 Mo. 262, 55 S. W. 863;
Glencoe Lime Co. v. Wind (1900) 86 Mo. App. 163; Scheele v. Lafayette Bank (1906)
120 Mo. App. 611, 97 S. W. 621.
8. Thornton v. Smith (1841) 7 Mo. 86; Jones v. Miller (1849) 12 Mo. 408; Page v.
Becker (1862) 31 Mo. 466; Hicks v. Hamilton (1898) 144 Mo. App. 495, 46 S. W. 432,
overruled by Crone v. Stinde (1900) 156 Mo. 262, 55 S. W. 863; O'Connellv. Trust Co.
(1912) 165 Mo. App. 398, 147 S. W. 841.
9. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Water Co. (1890) 42 Mo. App. 118; Howsmon v. Waterworks Co. (1893) 119 Mo. 304, 24 S. W. 784; Houck v. Cape Girardeau Waterworks Co.
(1908) Mo. App. 114 S. W. 199.
10. Robbins v. Ayres (1847) 10 Mo. 538.
11. Dean v. Walker (1883) 107 Il1. 540; Emmett v. Brophy (1884) 42 Oh. St. 82;
Bassett v. Hughes (1877) 43 Wis. 319; Rogers v. Gosnell (1873) 51 Mo. 466; Fitzgerald
v. Barker (1884) 85 Mo. 13; St. Louis v. Von Phul (1895) 133 Mo. 561, 34 S. W. 843.
12. Revised;Statutes 1909, § 2773.
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tween two parties on a valid consideration may be enforced, whether
oral or written, by the person for whose benefit it was made even tho he
3
was not named in the contract and was not a privy to the consideration.'
The obligation to pay the beneficiary is a primary one, hence not within
14
the statute of frauds.
The code provision requiring suits to be brought in the name of the
real party in interest 15 has been referred to in many Missouri cases as
conferring upon the beneficiary of a contract the right to maintain an
action it. 15 The contrary view has been taken by Professor Clark in an
article in a previous number of the Law Series of this Bulletin. 17
Payment beneficiary cases usually involve an undertaking to pay
another's debt. Several cases in this state hold that in order for the
third person to recover on the contract there must be some duty owed by
the promisee to that person. 18 This would seem to preclude a recovery in
the gift beneficiary cases, but in St. Louis v. Von Phul19 the court enforced
a promise where no such duty existed and Crone v. Stinde 0 stands squarely
for the proposition that no duty need be owed to the third person. In
the latter case A bought mortgaged lands without assuming the mortgage
debt. On selling them to B, B promised A that he would pay C, the mortgagee, and C was allowed to recover upon the contract as the one for
whose benefit it was made. "We know of no reason," said the court,
"why under our rulings he [C] is not entitled to sue for and recover
judgment for the same notwithstanding A was under no obligation either
legal or equitable to pay the debt."
The recent case of Boone County Lumber Co. v. Neidermeyer2 ' involves
the right of one for whose benefit a contract is made, to sue thereon.
One Torbitt wishing to build some houses executed certain notes and trust
deeds to the defendant who agreed to raise money thereon and pay the
plaintiff for such lumber as Torbitt should purchase from it. Torbitt
bought lumber from the plaintiff who sued the defendant on the latter's
agreement with Torbitt. It will be noticed that this case is not exactly
similar to the payment beneficiary cases which have arisen. The agreement here was not to pay an existing debt as in the usual cases, but to
pay a debt to be created in the future. At the time of making the promise
Torbitt owed no obligation to the plaintiff. The court, however, allowed
13.
Leckie v. Bennett (1911) 160 Mo. App. 145, 141 S. W. 706.
14. Robbins v. Ayres (1847) 10 Mo. 538; Besshears v. Rowe (1870) 46 Mo. 501;
Flancgan v. Hutchinson (1871) 47 Mo. 237; Beardslee v. Morgner (1877) 4 Mo. App.
139; Duerre v. Rediger (1895) 65 Mo. App. 407; Heddin v. Schneblin (1907) 126 Mo.
App. 478, 104 S. W. 887; Leckse v. Bennett (1911) 160 Mo. App. 145, 141 S. W. 706.

Contra: Nunn v. Carroll (1899) 83 Mo. App. 135.
15. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1729.
16. Rogers v. Gosnell (1873) 51 Mo. 466; Ellis v. Harrison (1891) 104 Mo. 270.
17. 4 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin. p. 30.
18. Ins. Co. v. Waterworks Co. (1890) 42 Mo. App. 118; Howsmon v. Water-

works Co. (1893) 119 Mo. 304; 24 8. W. 784: licks v. Hamilton (1898) 144 Mo. 495,
46 S. W. 432; Devers v. Howard (1898) 144 Mo. 671, 46 S. W. 625; Street v. Goodale
(1898) 77 Mo. App. 318; Harbergv. Arnold (1899) 78 Mo. App. 237.
19.
(1895) 133 Mo. 561.
20. (1900) 156 Mo. 262, 55 S. W. 863.
21.
(M6. 1915) 173 S. W. 57.
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recovery but treated it as a strict payment beneficiary case similar to
Lawrence v. Fox. 2
In deciding the case the court did not discuss the
fact that the debt was not in existence at the time the contract was made.
But in allowing recovery the court was not advancing a new principle as
at first appears. In Street v. Goodale,2 3 the defendant agreed with one
Manard to pay any checks which the latter might give for certain contemplated purchases. The defendant subsequently refused to pay and the
plaintiff, payee of the checks, brought an action against the defendant on
his agreement with Manard. The court held that the no debt existed
until sometime after the contract was made, there was no reason why
the promise might not attach and become effective and the plaintiff was
allowed a recovery.2 4 The case of Boone County Lumber Co. v. Niedermeyer is clearly in accord with the great weight of authority in the United
States as well as in Missouri, and goes the full length in allowing payment
beneficiaries to recover on contracts entered into for their benefit.
G. L. D.
MASTER AND SERVANT-DUTY
AID TO INJURED EMPLOYEE.

OF EMPLOYER TO

FURNISH MEDICAL

HUNICKE V. MERAMEC QUARRY Co.'-The

common law recognized no duty to care for the sick or injured. But
where a relation existed such as that of parent and child, a duty of providing medical aid was imposed upon the parent. A few early cases in
England indicated that a master was under a legal obligation to provide
for his sick or injured servant,2 but such a duty was never enforced except
in cases of domestic service and its existence has been very generally
3
repudiated since Lord Mansfield's decision in Newby v. Wiltshire.
A master is under a legal obligation to provide necessary medical
attention for his sick or injured apprentice.4 But the relation of master
and apprentice is more nearly analogous to that of parent and child than
to the relation of master and servant. In admiralty it is well established
that, except where the sickness or injury is the result of the seaman's own
gross negligence, seamen are entitled to medical attention at the expense
of the ship and the shipowner. 5 The right constitutes a part of the
contract for wages and is a material part of the compensation for labor
and services of the seaman. 6 The owner is liable for the consequences of
22.
23.

(1859) 20 N. Y. 268.
(1898) 77 Me. App. 318.

24. Ace., Bank of Laddonia v. Commission Co. (1909) 139 Me. App. 110. 120
S. W. 648.
1. (1914) 172 S. W. 43.
2. King v. Hales-Owen (1718) 11 Mod. 278: Rex v. Christ Church (1760) Burrow
Sett. Cas. 494; Rex v. Wintersett (1783) Cald. 298.
3.

(1782) 2 Esp. 739.

4. Easley v. Craddock (1826) 4 Rand. (Va.) 423; Regina v. Smith (1837) 8 Car. &
P. 153, 4 L. R. A. N. s. 50, note.
5. Chandler v. Grieves (1792) 2 H. B1. 606; Harden v. Gordon (1823) 2 Mason 541;
The City of Alexandria (1878) 17 Fed. 390; The Explorer (1884) 20 Fed. 135; The W. L.
White (1865) 25 Fed. 503; The Neptune (1887) 30 Fed. 925,4 L. R. A. N. s. 68, note.
6. Harden v. Gordon (1823) 2 Mason 541.
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failure to provide medical treatment. 7 The officers and seamen are considered fellow servants and the owner is only liable in damages for injuries
caused by the unseaworthiness or defective appliances of the ship. 8
However, maritime law and the common law governing employment on
land grew up under very different conditions and customs. Because of
the nature of the business of navigation, the distances covered, and the
perils and hardships encountered, it is easy to see that the seaman is
necessarily more dependent upon the shipowner than any other employee.
The relation of master and servant has not been treated as like that
of parent and child, shipowner and seaman, or master and apprentice.
It is almost the universal rule that an employer is not under a legal duty
to provide medical aid to an employee injured in his service. 9 But
because in many instances the strict application of this rule would reach
harsh and unihumanitarian results the courts have hesitated to apply it.
Thus in many cases a subordinate official or employee has been allowed
to bind his employer for physician's services 10 to an injured fellow servant.
Some courts suggest that the employer should act as agent of the employee
in calling aid. In B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. State" it was said that the employer
performs his duty when the injured man is carried to the nearest place
where he can get help. A South Carolina statute imposes upon employers
the duty of notifying a physician of an employee's injury.' 2 Where
employees for special purposes have been allowed to bind their employer
for medical services to an injured employee there has been in several
jurisdictions a tendency to limit the doctrine to railroads,1 3
Altho no
case is put upon the analogy to the admiralty cases, the modern railroad,
taking its employees far from their homes and to deserted sections of the
country where it is difficult to get aid without the assistance of the company, does occupy a position analogous to that of the shipowner. In
cases where railway employees have been injured far from their homes,
perhaps it is because of the existence of situations and reasons similar to
7.
The Vigilant (1887) 30 Fed. 288; Petersen v. Swan (1884) 50 N. Y. Super. Ct.
46; The City of Carlisle (1889) 39 Fed. 807; The Scotland (1890) 42 Fed. 925; The City of

Alexandria (1883) 17 Fed. 390.
8. Grimsleg v. Hawkins (1891) 46 Fed. 400; The Lizzie Frank (1887) 31 Fed.
477; The Noddle urn (1886) 28 Fed. 855; The City of Alexandria (1883) 17 Fed. 390.

9. Wennall v. Adney (1802) 3 Bos. & 11. 247; Makarsky v. Canadian Pacific
By. Co., 15 Manitoba L. R. 53; Sevier v. Birmingham, etc. By. Co. (1890) 92 Ala., 258,
9 So. 405; D. & R. G. fy. Co. v. Iles (1898) 25 Colo. 19, 53 Pac. 222; Sweetwater Mfg.
Co. v. Clover (1859) 29 Ga. 399; Toledo, W. & W. fly. v. Rodrigues (1868) 47 Il. 188;
Vorass v. Rosenberry (1899) 85 Ill. App. 623; Atlantic & Pacific fy. Co. v. Reisner
(1877) 18 Kan. 458; Union Pac. tly. Co. v. Beatty (1886) 35 Kan. 265, 10 Pac. 856;
Clark v. Mo. Pac. fy. (1892) 48 Kan. 654, 29 Pac. 1138; Lithgow Mfg. Co. v. Samuel
(1903) 24 Ky. 1590; Jesserich v. Walruff (1892) 51 Mo. App. 270; Spelman v.
Gold Coin Min. & Mill. Co. (1901) 26 Mont. 76, 66 Pac. 597; Malone v. Robinson
(Miss., 1893) 12 So. 709; Voorheesv. N. Y. Central Ry. Co. (1909) 114N.Y.Sup. 242,92
N. E. 1105; King v. I. C. St. fly. Co. (1902) 23 R. I. 583, 51 Atl. 301.
p.'i
10. It Is within the powers of a corporation to provide medical aid to employees.
Toledo, W. & W. fy. Co. v. Rodrigues (1868) 47 Ill. 188; Toledo W. & W. fy. Co. v
Prince (1869) 50 Ill. 26; Bedord Bell Ry. Co. v. McDonald (1897) 17 Ind. App. 492, 46
N. E. 1022.
11. (1874) 41 MVd.268.
12. South Caolna Civil Code 1912, § 3228.
13. Mceisenbach v. Cooperage Co. (1891) 45 Mo. App. 132; Goodshaw v. Stuck
Bros. (1900) 109 Ky. 285, 58 S. W. 781;, New Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Shaley (1900) 25
Ind. App. 282; Swazey v. Union Mfg. Co. (1875) 42 Conn. 556.
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those which gave rise to the admiralty doctrine, that the courts first
compelled railways to pay for medical aid to their employees and that
the cases show a tendency to limit the liability to such employers. It is
said in Chaplin v. Freeland, 4 where the court refused to hold a manufacturing company liable to a physician called by an employee for services
rendered to an injured employee, that "a railroad occupies a peculiar
position with reference to such matters, conveying their employees necessarily to places remote from their homes and subjecting them to unusual
hazards and dangers." Other courts have gone a little further and
suggested that the doctrine should be limited to companies engaged in a
business dangerous to their employees, 1" while still others apply it to all
but individual employers.' 6 However, the employee's authority is
difficult to sustain upon legal theory and if the power exists in any employees on principles of agency, it is not easy to see why it should not
exist in all. 17 The employee's authority is put upon various grounds such
as that damages are kept down;18 that the interests of the company are
subserved since the injury of trained men to some extent retards the
operation of the road; 19 that the moral obligation of the company gives
its agents implied power to so bind it; 20 that the highest agent of the com21
pany represents the company in the emergency and can do what it could;
and that the emergency imposes a legal duty upon the company to provide
medical aid. 22 Such decisions show that there is a growing public demand for corporations to care for their employees and that the courts
are attempting to cause them to do so by every means possible without
going so far as to overthrow the common law rule and assert that there
is a positive duty. Many corporations have met this by maintaining23
a hospital or relief fund with money deducted from employee's wages.
By doing so a company binds itself to furnish medical attention when
reasonable 24 and transportation to the hospital. 25 But a custom of a
company to pay for medical services rendered to employees injured in
its service is not binding until it is shown to be so general as to raise a
26
presumption that the services were rendered with reference to it.
14.

(1893) 7 Ind. App. 676, 34 N. E. 1007.

15. Holmes v. McAllister (1900) 123 Mich. 493, 83 N. W. 220; Salter v. Neb. Tel.
Co. (1907) 79 Neb. 373, 112 N. W. 600; Spelman v. Gold Coin Min. & Mil. Co. (1901)
26 Mont. 76, 66 Paec. 597.
16. Holmes v. McAllister (1900) 123 Mich. 493; Malone v. Robinson (Miss., 1893)
12 So. 709.
17. Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) §§ 341, 994.
18.
U. P. Ry. Go. v. Beatty (1886) 35 Kan. 625, 10 Paec. 845.
19. Atlantic & P. Ry. Co. v. Reisner (1877) 18 Kan. 458.

20. Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Rodrigues (1868) 47 Il. 188; Sevier v. B. S. &
T. River Ry. Co. (1890) 92 Ala. 258, 9 So. 405.
21. Evansvtlle, etc. Ry. Co. v. Freeland (1892) 4 Ind. App. 207, 30 N. E. 803;
Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Smith (1889) 121 Ind. 353, 22 N. E. 775; Toledo, St
L. & K. C. %Co. v. Mylott (1893) 6 Ind. App. 438.
22. T. H. & I. By. Co. v. McMurray (1884) 98 Ind. 358; 0. & M. By. Co. v.
Early (1895) 141 Ind. 73, 40 N. E. 257.
23. Beck v. Penn. R. R. Co. (1899) 63 N. J. L. 32. It Is not ultra vires for a
corporation to maintain such a fund.
24. Southern Pac. Co. v. Mauldin (1898) 19 Tex. Civ. App. 166, 46 S. W. 650.
25. Gulf, C. & S. F. By. Co. v. Harney (Texas, 1899) 45 S. W. 791.
26. M. & MA/.
By. Co. v. Jay (1878) 61 Ala. 247.
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The only jurisdiction holding that an employer must furnish medical
aid is Indiana.
The duty is imposed where there is an emergency in which
the employee is unable to help himself. This is plainly an exception to
the individualistic rule of the common law. There are several cases
7
which expressly negative such a duty even tho there is an emergency,
while many others state without qualification that an employer is under
no duty to provide medical aid.28 The Indiana cases are put entirely on
the ground of humanity and moral obligation. 29
In the recent case of Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that the plaintiff in an action under the death
statute stated a cause of action when he alleged that his intestate, an
employee of the defendant corporation, was so badly injured by cars
moving into the defendant's yards that a sudden emergency was created
which required the immediate attention of a physician and that the
corporation negligently allowed the employee to bleed to death before any
effective aid was furnished him."0 In short the employer's negligence
in not giving aid makes him liable for the employee's death. There is
no workman's compensation act or other statute in Missouri on this point.
The decision would hardly be expected in view of the earlier Missouri
cases, some of which are emergency cases, holding that there is no such
duty 3' and that an employee or officer of a company cannot bind the company for physician's services unless authorized to do so. 3 2 The Missouri
court relies chiefly upon the Indiana cases, but puts the duty on the
ground that because of general custom and the nature of the relation
of master and servant, it has come to be required by law, just as the
duty of supplying a safe place to work and safe appliances to work with
has come to be required. Woodson, J., compares the duties of providing
safe appliances and of furnishing medical aid and says that the latter
27.

Voohreesv. N.

Y. Central R.R. Co. (1909) 114N. Y. Sup. 242,92 N.E. 1105,

PeninsularBy. Co. v. Gary (1886) 22 Fla. 356; Meisenbach v. Cooperage Co. (1891)
45 Mo. App. 232.

28.

Newby v. Wiltshire (1782) 2 Esp. 739; Wennall v. Adney (1802) 3 Bos. & P.

247; Davis v. Forbes (1898) 171 Mass. 548, 51 N. E. 20; U. P. Ry. Co. v. Beatty (1886)
35 Kan. 265, 10 Pac. 845; Jesserichv. Walruff (1892) 51 Mo. App. 270; Toledo, W. &
W. Ry. Co. v. Rodrigues (1868) 47 Iii. 188.
29. The court In T. H. & I. Ry. Co. v. McMurray (1884) 98 Ind. 358 says that
"if It be conceded that honesty and fair dealing require that medical assistance should
be furnished then the law requires it, for the law always requires honesty and fair
dealing."
"Before this broad principle bare pecuniary considerations become things
of little weight. There may be cases in which a denial of the right of the conductor
to summon medical aid to one of the trainmen would result In suffering or death,
while on the other hand, the assertion of the right can at the most never do more than
entail upon the corporation pecuniary loss."
30. The result of the case might be justified on the ground that the defendant's
manager undertook to care for him but did so negligently and actually prevented
another, who wished to bind the wound to stop the flow of blood, from aiding him and
thus made his condition worse than if he had left him alone.
31. Jesserich v. Walruff (1892 ) 51 Mo. App. 270.
32. Tucker v. St. Louis K. C. & Northern Ry. Co. (1873) 54 Mo. 177; Brown v.
M. K. & T. Ry. Co. (1877) 67 Mo. 122; M~eisenbach v. Southern Cooperage Co. (1891)
45 Mo. App. 232. In Evans v. Marion Mining Co. (1903) 100 Mo. App. 670, 75 S. W.
178; and Weinsberg v. Cordage Co. (1908) 135 Mo. App. 553, 116 S.W. 461. the president
of a corporation was allowed to bind the company for physician's services because it
was for the general benefit of the company.
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"has ripened into law from wise and humane usages and customs that
are so old that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." While
the customs are without doubt old, the earlier decisions do not warrant
the statement that they had ripened into law.
If we adopt such a doctrine what would its limitations be? Since it
is founded upon the broad grounds of humanity and moral obligation the
necessity of strict limitation is apparent. The cases make the duty an
emergency duty which arises and expires with an emergency where death
or great bodily harm will result if the injured man is unattended. It is
required that he be attended until the emergency ceases, 33 or until he
can be turned over to the public authorities.34 These limitations seem
reasonable and proper, but limiting the liability to railroads or any other
particular class of employers seems illogical. Since the relation of seaman and shipowner imposes the duty to provide medical aid on the ground
of implied contract, because of the peculiar nature of the business it would
be more logical to impose the duty upon an employer whose business is
closely analagous.
If the employer is to be under a duty to give aid, it would seem to
follow that he should be liable for the negligence of the physician employed.
This is stated in Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., and the Indiana courts

intimate that they would approve such a rule. But of course the general
rule is the other way, 35 except where the employer is negligent in selecting
or keeping the physician, 36 unless there is37a benefit fund kept up by deducting from the wages of the employees.
But it is difficult to see why a doctrine based on humanity, moral
duty and fair dealing should be limited to employers and employees. One
who injures a trespasser or stranger and leaves him unattended is certainly
as reprehensible morally as an employer who does not care for an employee.
Surely, too, the relation to a man one injures is almost as close as that of
an employer to an employee injured by his own negligence. The common
law recognized no duty to an injured trespasser.38 But as in the case of
master and servant, we find a court going so far as to disregard the common law rule39 and other authorities making statements inconsistent with
it. In Northern Central Ry. v. Price40 where a trespasser had been run
0. & M. By. Co. v. Early (1895) 141 Ind. 73; Evansville, etc. By. Co. v. Free34. Salter v. Neb. Tel. Co. (1907) 79 Neb. 373.
35. Maine v. C. B. & Q. By. Co. (1897) 109 Iowa 260, 80 N. W. 315; Southern
Pae. By. Co. v. Mauldin (1898) 19 Tex. Civ. App. 166, 46 S. W. 650; Union Pac. By.
33.

land (1892) 4 Ind. 207, 30 N. E. 803.

Co. v. Artist (1894) 60 Fed. 365; A. T. & S. F. By. Co. v. Zeiler (1894) 54 Kan. 340.
36. M. K. & T. By. Co. v. Freeman (1904) 97 Tex. 394, 79 S. W. 9; Wabash By.
Co. v. Kelly (1898) 153 Ind. 119, 52 N. E. 152; P. C. C. & S. L. By. Co. v. Sullivan
(1895) 141 nd. 83, 40 N. E. 138; Cummings v. Chicago & N. W. By. Co. (1900) 89
111. App. 199.

37. Texas & P. Coal Co. v. Connaughton (1899) 20 Tex. Civ. App. 642, 50 S. W.
173; Sawdey v. Spokane Falls & N. By. Co. (1902) 30 Wash. 349, 70 Paa. 972.
38. Union Poe. By. Co. v. Cappier (1903) 66 Kan. 649, 72 Pac. 281.
39. Whitesides v. Southern By. Co. (1901) 128 N. C. 229, 38 S. E. 878. A trespasser was run over by a train and left unattended. The railroad was held liable
for his death by leaving him unattended the It might not have been liable for his
Injury.
40.

(1868) 29 Md. 420.
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over by a train, the court said that " it was the duty of the servants of the
company, when the man was found on the pilot of the engine in a helpless
and insensible condition, to remove him and do it with a proper regard to
his safety and the laws of humanity." This case is cited by Beech in
support 4 ' of his statement that "under certain circumstances a railroad may
owe a duty to a trespasser after the injury. When a trespasser has been
run down, it is the plain duty of the company to render whatever service
is possible to mitigate the severity of the injury. The train that has
occasioned the harm must be stopped and the injured person looked
after and when it is necessary removed to a place of safety and carefully
nursed until other relief can be brought to the disabled person." Surely
this could not be objected to on grounds of humanity and moral obligation.
The possible and proper limitations of the doctrine that an
employer must provide aid for his injured employee would undoubtedly be difficult to determine since it is clearly a departure from
the common law rule. It is evident, tho, that there is a tendency today
for the law to become more humanitarian and this is especially true in
regard to employers' liability. Recent statutes, some of which provide
for medical attention to employees, 42 indicate, as do recent cases, the
development in this field of the law. Furnishing medical aid, like furnishing a safe place to work and safe appliances to work with, is a matter
which is peculiarly within the power of the employer and is something
over which the employee has no control. Since under modern labor
conditions and methods of business the employer must be trusted in such
matters, it is submitted that on principle it is entirely reasonable to place
upon employers the duty to give emergency treatment to employees
L. M. H.
injured in their service.
NEGLIGENCE-LEGAL

EFFECT OF VIOLATION OF SPEED ORDINANCE

UPON THE LIABILITY OF RAILROADS.

HUNT V. ST. Louis & SAN FRAN-

Cisco R. R. Co. '-At common law a railroad is not limited to any particular rate of speed; whether a given rate is negligence, is ordinarily a
2
There being no
question of fact depending upon the circumstances.
rule of general application courts read into statutes giving municipalities
authority to abate nuisances and provide for the public welfare, the right
to regulate the rate of speed at which railroads may be operated within
the corporate limits. Usually, therefore, each municipality under such
police powers for the better protection of life and property within its
41.

Beech, Contributory Negligence (3d ed.) § 215.

42. South Carolina Civil Code 1912, § 3228; Illinois Revised Statutes 1913,
p. 1209.
1. (1915) 171 S. W. 64.
2. Goodwin v. Chicago, R. I. & P.R . R. Co. (1881) 75 Mo. 73; Main v. H. &
St. Joe Ry. Co. (1885) 18 Mo. App. 388; Haley v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1906) 197 Mo. 15,
93 S. W. 1120; Central R. B. Co. v. Ingram (1893) 98 Ala. 395, 12 So. 801; Chicago B.
& Q. B. B. Co. v. Campbell (1905) 34 Colo. 380, 83 Pac. 138.
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limits, has passed an ordinance fixing the maximum rate of speed.' Such
ordinances do not affect the ordinary rules as to liability for negligence.
A violation of the duty of care thus prescribed can be made the foundation
of an action only in favor of those intended to be benefited; but since such
speed ordinances do not designate any particular class, they are of general
application 4 as contrasted with legislative enactments where those coming
within their designation are necessarily restricted. 5 The imposition of

a fine for a violation thereof does not relieve the company from civil
liability for injuries resulting from such violation,' and the existence of
the maximum limit does not relieve the railroad from the ordinary duty

to use care which duty
may in some circumstances require a rate of speed
7

below the maximum.
Courts are at variance as to whether a violation of an ordinance
which is the direct and proximate cause of an injury is negligence per se,
or simply evidence of negligence to go to the jury.' The great weight of
authority makes it negligence per se. 9 In Stotler v. Chicago & Alton R. R.
Co., o Lamm, C. J., states that this "doctrine somewhat shaken at one time
but never exploded, may now be taken as so buttressed by both reason
and authority as to withstand any (but a legislative) assault."
The difference between the two rules first set out above seems to be
this: according to the first view, evidence of failure to comply with the
ordinance is sufficient to establish negligence conclusively; according to
the other, the wrongful act or omission is but an evidential fact tending
to prove negligence. However, they appear to accord in that evidence of
a violation of the ordinance is usually held sufficient to warrant the jury
in finding the railroad company guilty of negligence. 1
No matter which
3. Prewitt v. M. K. & T. By. Co. (1896) 134 Mo. 615, 36 S. W. 667; Jacksonv.
K. C. Ft. S. & Ml. By. Co. (1900) 157 Mo. 621, 58 S. W. 32; Sluder v. St. Louis
Transit Co. (1905) 189 Mo. 107, 88 S. W. 648; 2 Redfield, Railways (5th ed.) 564.
4.
Backenstone v. W., St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co. (1885) 23 Mo. App. 48; Bluedorn v.
Mo. Pac. By. Co. (1891) 108 Mo. 439, 18 S. W. 1103; Loring v. K. C. Ft. S. & M. By.
Co. (1895) 128 Mo. 349, 31 S. W. 6; Jackson v. K. C. Ft. S. M. Ry. Co. (1900) 157 Mo.
621, 58 S. W. 32; Omaha St. By. Co. v. Duval (1894) 37 Neb. 52, 58 N. W. 531.
5. Bell v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co. (1880) 72 Mo. 50; Glazer v. Rothschild
(1909) 221 Mo. 180, 120 S. W. 1.
6.
Fath v. Tower Grove & Fayette By. Co. (1891) 105 Mo. 537, 16 S. W. 913.
7.
Holden v. Missouri B. R. Co. 177 Mo. 456, 83 S. W. 992; Story v. St. Louis
Transit Co. (1904) 108 Mo. App. 424, 83 S. W. 992.
8. Baltimore City Passenger Co. v. McDonnell (1875) 43 Md. 534; Harrison v.
Sutler St. By. Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 156, 165, 47 Pac. 1019; Caswell v. Boston Ry. Co.
(1906) 190 Mass. 527, 77 N. E. 380.
In at least two jurisdictions a violation is no evidence of negligence. Rockford
City Ry. Co. v. Blake (1898) 173 Ill. 354, 50 N. E. 1070; Ford'sAdm'r v. Paducah City
By. Co. (1907) 124 Ky. 488, 99 S. W. 355. In the latter case It was held not to be
prejudicial error to refuse to allow proof of an ordinance regulating the operation of
street cars, the court saying that "the violation of an ordinance is no more evidence
of negligence than obedience to its provisions would he evidence of due care."
9. Keim v. Union By. & Transit Co. (1886) 90 Mo. 314, 2 S. W. 427; Murray v.
Mo. Pac. By. Co. (1890) 101 Mo. 236, 13 S. W. 817; Hutchinson v. Mo. Pac. By. Co.
(1900) 161 Mo. 246, 61 S. W. 635; Meyers v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1903) 99 Mo. App.
363, 73 S. W. 379; Moore v. St. Louis TransitCo. (1906) 194 A/o. 1, 92 SW. 390; Toey
v. Burlington C. R. & N. B. R. Co. (1895) 94 Iowa 256, 62 N. W. 761; Pittsburg C. C.
R. R. Co. v. Lightheizer (1904) 163 Ind. 247, 71 N. E. 218; Memphis St. By. Co. v.
Haynes (1904) 112 Tenn. 712, 81 S. W. 374.
10. 200 Mo. 107, 121, 98 S. W. 509.
11.
Baltimore Passenger Co. v. McDonnell (1875) 43 Md. 534; Atlanta By. &
Power Co. v. Owens (1904) 119 Ga. 835, 47 S. E. 213, 214.
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of the foregoing rules is accepted, the company is not liable if such violation is not the proximate cause of the injury.' 2 Nor does the fact that
defendant had been running at a rate forbidden raise a presumption that
the injury was caused by such excessive speed.13 In determining liability
most of the cases seem to indicate that the Missouri courts apply the
"but for" test of causation. 4 The negligence of the railroad may in
some cases become so remote as to be no longer properly considered the
proximate cause. The question should always be, whether the plaintiff's
injury was the natural and probable consequence of defendant's negligence."
As a method of raising this question the ordinance should be pleaded,
for otherwise a violation thereof is not negligence per se even in those
jurisdictions following the prevailing view. In other jurisdictions evidence
of a violation of such an ordinance is inadmissible for showing negligence
unless the ordinance is pleaded.' 6 The general rule is that the the ordinance is not pleaded, its violation may be proved as a fact bearing upon
the question of negligence.' 7 Courts will not take judicial notice of such
ordinances. 1
Even where the majority view obtains that the violation of a speed
ordinance is negligence per se, it is usually held that it does not affect such
defenses as contributory negligence. 1" It is a well-recognized principle
of law, however, that the doctrine that contributory negligence defeats
recovery has no application in cases of wilful, wanton, or reckless torts;2"
and where the violation of the ordinance is flagrant, but neither wilf ul
nor wantonly reckless, the courts require the proof of contributory negligence to be clearly made out. 1
12. Braxton v. H. & St. J. R. R. Co. (1883) 77 Mo. 455; Moore v. St. Louis
Transit Co. (1902)95 Mo. App. 728, 75 S. W. 699; Murray v. St. Louis Transit Co.
(1904) 108 Mo. App. 501, 83 S. W. 995.
13. Evans & Howard Fire Brick Co. v. St. Louis & San Franciscofy. Co. (1885)
17 Mo. App. 624; Bluedorn v. Ao. Pac. fy.
Co. (1893) 121 Mo. 258, 35 S. W. 943;
Battles v. United fiys. Co. (1913) 178 Mo. App. 596, 161 S. W. 614.
14. Bergman v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. fy.
Co. (1886) 88 Mo. 678; Hanlon v.
Mo. Pac. ly. Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 381, 16 S. W. 233; Lloyd v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Co.
(1895) 128 Mo. 595, 31 S. W. 110; Hutchinson v. Mo. Pac. fy. Co. (1901) 161 Mo. 246,
61 S. W. 852.
15. Poepperv. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. (1878) 67 Mo. 715; Tobey v. McMahon (1905)
114 Mo. App. 442, 90 S. W. 113; Hegberg v. St. Louis & S. F. R. B. Co. (1912) 164
Mo. App. 514, 552, 147 S. W. 192; Sherman and Redfleld, Negligence (4th ed.) § 26.
16. Putman v. Detroit United Rys. Co. (1911) 164 Mich. 342, 129 N. W. 860, and
cases cited.
17. Robertson v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. ly. Co. (1884) 84 Mo. 119; Riley v.
W. St. L. & P. By. Co. (1885) 18 Mo. App. 385; White v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe B. B. Co. (1900) 84 Mo. App. 411, 418; Shell v.
ae. Pac. fy.
Co. (1908) 132 Mo.
App. 528, 535, 112 S. W. 39; San Antonio St. fly. Co. v. Mechler (1894) 87 Texas 467,
29 S. W. 202; Norfolk & P. Traction Co. v. Forest'sAdm'x (1909) 109 Va. 658, 64 S. W.
1034.
18. Cox v. City of St. Louis (1848) 11 Mo. 431; Keane v. Klausman (1886) 21
Mo. App. 485. Cf. Norfolk & P. Traction Co. v. Forest Adm'x (1909) 109 Va. 658,
64 S. E. 1034.
19.
Weller v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul fy.
Co. (1894) 120 Mo. 635, 25
S. W. 532; Paine v. C. & A. fy. Co. (1895) 129 Mo. 405, 31 S. W. 885; Stotler v. C. &
A. fy.
Co. (1907) 204 Mo. 619, 103 S. V. 1.
20. Rosenfeldt v. St. Louis & Suburban fy. Co. (1903) 180 Mo. 554,565, 79 S. W.
706; Abbott v. K. C. Elevated By. Co. (1906) 121 Mo. App. 582, 97 S. W. 198.
21.
Bluedorn v. Mo. Pac. fy. Co. (1891) 108 Mo. 439, 449.
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The question of reliance upon the observance of an ordinance often
becomes important as affecting contributory negligence. It appears to
relieve the plaintiff of the imputation of contributory negligence, as
where one could have crossed a railroad track in safety providing the train
had been running within the lawful rate prescribed. 22 In Rissler v. St.
Louis Transit Co.,23 one injured at a railroad crossing was allowed to
recover on the presumption that he anticipated and relied upon a compliance with the ordinance regulating the speed of cars. Tho it did not
appear that he knew of such ordinance, his apparent omission of care was
attributed to this presumptive reliance. More recent cases, as illustrated by Veelker Products Co. v. United Rys. Co.,2 4 refuse to follow this
doctrine unless it appears that the injured party approaching the track
knew of the ordinance and relied upon it, or knew of the usual rate of
speed at that point and acted upon such knowledge. The evidence in
Voelker Products Co. v. United Rys. Co. showed a course of action that

might have been either careful or negligent, depending on whether plaintiff
relied upon the defendant's compliance with the ordinance. The plaintiff
offered no evidence to prove that he knew of the ordinance or relied upon
it, and it was held that the directed verdict for defendant in the court
below was proper. The court concluded, however, that an exception
to the rule still obtains where a person approaching a track has been
killed or rendered incapable of speaking upon the subject at all. Where
the party injured survives and goes upon the stand, no presumption to
the above effect is indulged. If the plaintiff fails to show that he was
familiar with the provisions of the ordinance, or that he relied upon it,
t will not be presumed in excuse of contributory negligence that he did
rely thereon. 25 Evidence of such an ordinance is admissible to relieve
the plaintiff of the effect of contributory negligence tho the ordinance is
not pleaded.26
In Powers v. St. Louis Transit Co., 27 the presumption that a pedestrian
before crossing the track did look and listen and was therefore in the
exercise of due care was held not to be rebutted by testimony of the
motorman that the deceased "did not seem to look or notice anything,"
and of the conductor "that she did not look back at all." Such presumption was held to be rebutted however in Porterv. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.
where it appeared that deceased "bad be looked must have seen it [the
22. Ieliny v. Mo. Paec. iBy. Co. (1890) 101 Mo. 67, 13 S. W. 806; Sullivan v.
Mo. Pae. By. Co. (1893) 117 Mo. 214, 23 S. W. 149; Hutchinson v. Mo. Pac. By. Co.

(1900) 161 Mo. 246, 61 S. W. 635; Riska v. Union Depot R. B. Co. (1903) 180 Mo. 168,
79 S. W. 445.
23.
(1905) 113 Mo. App. 120, 124, 87 S. W. 578.

Cf. Gratiot v. Mo. Pac. By.

Co. (1893) 116 Uo. 450, 21 S.W. 1094.
24.

25.

(1914) 170 S. W. 332.

Cf. Barret v. Delano (1915) 174 S. W.

Paulv. United Rys. Co. (1911) 152 Mo. App. 577, 134 S. W. 3.

181,

183.

26. Meng v. St. Louis & Suburban Ry. Co. (1904) 108 Mo. App. 553, 84 S. W.
213; Denver City Tramway Co. v. Martin (1908) 44 Colo. 62, 98 Pac. 83.
27.
(1907) 202 Mo. 267, 282, 100 S. W. 655. See also McKenzie v. United Bys.
Co. (1909) 216 Mo. 1, 115 S. W. 13; Northern Pae. By. Co. v. Spike (1903) 57 C. C. A.

384, 121 Fed. 44; Davenport. Rock Island & Northwestern By. Co. v. De Yaeger Adm'x
(1903) 112 Ii1. App. 537.

8

LAV

SERIES, MISSOURI

BULLETIN

train] in time to have avoided the colision."'2 It seems difficult to appreciate the reasons for such an artificial and arbitrary distinction. It
appears that where the injured person survives, the burden of showing a
freedom from contributory negligence is placed upon him contrary to
our well-settled rule that contributory negligence is a matter of defense to
be pleaded and proved by defendant. The rule of procedure is that such
burden is upon defendant. A presumption obtains that the injured party
was in the exercise of ordinary care at the time. It would seem that
Voelker Products Co. v. United Rys. Co. is in conflict with well adjudicated

principles, for before the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict after
proof of negligence conduct on the part of plaintiff not reasonably consistent with due care should be proved.
Even after proof of contributory negligence the plaintiff can still
recover if he brings his case within the operation of the "last clear chance"
doctrine. 29 The plaintiff's negligence is then no bar to his recovery
unless it was a directly contributing cause to the injury as distinguished
from a mere condition in the absence of which the accident would not
have happened. 0 Ordinarily to make the defendant liable under the "last
clear chance" rule, it must be shown that he failed to exercise due care
after the discovery of the plaintiff's peril. Yet where there is reason to
anticipate that the track is not clear, liability is not limited to the want of
care after the discovery of the danger. 31 The same rulings apply as to
trespassers.3 2 The statute declaring that persons who walk upon the
tracks are to be deemed trespassers in any action brought by them on
account of their injury,3" does not lessen the company's duty or impair
the general rule above stated.34
The foregoing principles were involved in the recent case of Hunt v.
St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co."1

The evidence indicated that

deceased after having become voluntarily intoxicated, had lain down
upon defendant's track. Defendant's train was running at a high rate of
speed in violation of a city ordinance, and the the engineer saw deceased,
he was unable to stop in time to avoid striking him. It was proved however that he could have stopped if the train had not been running at a
rate in excess of that prescribed. The defendant's motion for an instructed
verdict was overruled and the question of contributory negligence was
28. (1906) 199 Mo. 82, 97, 97 S. W. 880, Cf. Weller v. Chic-go, Milwaukee & St.
Paul R. R. Co. (1901) 164 Mo. 180, 64 8. W. 141.
29. Guenther v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1891) 108 Mo. 18, 18 S. W. 846;
Matz v. Mo. Pac. By. Co. (1908) 217 Mo. 275, 117 S. W. 584; Gumm v. K. C. Belt. By.
Co. (1909) 141 Mo. App. 306, 125 S. W. 796; I Law Series. Missouri Bulletin, p. 37.
30. Oates v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (1902) 168 Mo. 535, 68 S. W. 936.
31. Koenig v. Union Depot By. Co. (1903) 173 Mo. 698, 73 S. W. 698; Moore v.
St. Louis Transit Co. (1905) 194 Mo. 1, 92 S. W. 390; Everett v. St. Louis & S. F. R.
R. Co. (1908) 214 Mo. 54, 112 S. W. 486; turphy v. Wabash R. R. Co. (1910) 228
Mo. 56, 128 S. W. 481; Dyrcz v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1911) 238 Mo. 33, 141 S. W. 861.
32. Barker v. H. & St. J. R. B. Co. (1888) 98 Mo. 50; Scullin v. Wabash B. R.
Co. (1904) 184 Mo. 695, 83 S. W. 760; Eppstein v. Mo. Pae. By. Co. (1906) 197 Mo.

720, 94 S. W. 967; Hall v. Mo. Pae. Ry. Co. (1908) 219 Mo. 553,118 S. W. 56.
33. Revised Statutes 1909, § 3145.
34. Ahnefeld v. Wabash B. R. Co. (1908) 212 Mo. 280, 111 S. W. 95.
35.

(1915):171,.S. W. 64.
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submitted to the jury and found in plaintiff's favor. The majority of the
court held this was error since on the admitted facts deceased was negligent
as a matter of law. Lamm, C. J., dissenting 6 held that where it is shown
that the accident could have been avoided by the use of ordinary care had
the train been running at a rate of speed not prohibited by ordinance, the
question of contributory negligence is immaterial.
It is admitted that the violation of an ordinance, tho negligence per
se, does not deprive the offender of any of the common law defenses.
Without a clear expression to that effect there should be no disposition so
to penalize him. But there are present in this particular case the material
facts that intestate was unconscious of his peril and that if the train had
not been running at a rate in excess of that prescribed the accident could
have been averted. These facts were absent in Weller v. Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.,3" Paine v. C. & A. Ry. Co.,38 and Stotler v.
C. & A. Ry. Co.,3 9 in each of which the plaintiff was denied recovery
because of contributory negligence. If then the defendant in the principal
case could have averted the collision by complying with the ordinance
the deceased's negligence was but a condition, and the defendant's act
the direct and efficient cause of the injury. This view was advanced in
the early case of Maher v. Atlantic & Pac. R. R. Co., 4° where the court
suggested that altho railroad servants use every effort to avoid the injury
after discovering the peril of the person injured and find it impossible to
do so, still that will not excuse the company where it has been "guilty of
negligence which created the impossibility." 4
When an instruction to
that effect was asked to be approved in Guenther v. St. Louis, I. Mt. &
S. Ry. Co.," Kcllny v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 42 Dlauhi v. St. Louis I. Mt. &
S. Ry. Co., 43 and Sullivan v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 44 the court in each case
clearly refused to accept this doctrine. It was cited with approval however, in Murrel v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.4 5 The court then in the principal
case either overlooked the later decisions or else intended to reassert the
ruling of Sullivan v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., as the case was cited as authority
for its conclusion.
The manifest purpose of the speed ordinance is to make it possible
to avoid injuring one in a position of peril. Unless it is shown that the
party injured would have been struck tho the train had been running at
the lawful rate prescribed by the ordinance, his negligence should be
36. Walker, J., also dissented.
37.
(1894) 120 Mo. 635, 25 S. W. 532.
38. (1895) 129 Mo. 405, 31 S. W. 885.
39.
(1907) 204 Mo. 619, 103 S. W. 1.

40. (1876) 64 Mo. 267, 276.
of an ordinance.

In this case there was no question of a violation

41.
(1888) 95 Mo. 286, 8 S. W. 371.
42.
(1890) 101 Mo. 67, 13 S. W. 806.
43. (1891) 105 Mo. 645, 16 S. W. 281.
44.
(1893) 117 Mo. 214, 23 S. W. 149.
45. (1904) 105 Mo. App. 88, 94, 79 S. W. 505.
To the same effect, Koenig v.
Union Depot Ry.Co. (1902) 173 Mo. 698. 724, 73 S. W. 637.
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considered as no part of the legal cause. And tested by that rule the facts
of the principal case would seem to have authorized a recovery.
J. C. S.
DAMAGES-RECEIVER'S

LIABILITY

FOR

EXEMPLARY

DAMAGES.

COOK v. LusK. '-A master's liability for exemplary damages for the acts
of his servant irrespective of previous authorization or subsequent ratifica-

tion was not settled in this state until the decision in Canfield v. Chicago,
2
R. I. & P. Ry. Co.

A year previous to that decision, the opposite view

which had been taken in Rouse v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.' and announced
in other earlier cases 4 had been clearly repudiated obiter in Haehl v.
Wabash R. R. Co.6 The liability is the consequence of a strict application of
the principle of respondeatsuperior,and it seems that it will be enforced without discrimination against individual masters' as well as corporation
masters. This principle is now so firmly fixed' that it is no longer susceptible to effective attack; but it seems to ignore the objects of punitive
damages, to punish wrongdoers and to deter repetitions of the wrongful
act. To punish on the basis of respondeat superior is to misapply that
doctrine, for when we seek "to inflict punishment we enter the domain
of personal responsibility which must be founded on the act of the wrongdoer in fact, and the punishment [should be] inflicted on the perpetrator
alone." '
Nor does such exaction of exemplary damages seem to have any
deterring effect since it punishes persons who are not in a position to avoid
a recurrence of the wrongful acts. The rule has been justified as to corporation principals on the ground that "all attempts * * * to distinguish
between the guilt of the servant and the guilt of the corporation; or the
malice of the servant and the malice of the corporation; or the punishment
of the servant and the punishment of the corporation, is 'entirely fruitless,' and only tends to confuse the mind and confound the judgment."' 9
This position does not represent the view which obtains in the majority
of American jurisdictions where the master must be connected with the
1.
(1915) 172 S. W. 81.
2.
(1894) 59 Mo. App. 354.
3.
(1890) 41 Mo. App. 298.
4. Perkins v. M. K. & T. R. R. (1874) 55 Mo. 201, 214; Graham v. Pacific R.
I. Co. (1877) 66 Mo. 536, 545; Randolph v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. Co. (1885) 18
Mo. App. 609, 614.
5.
(1893) 119 Mo. 325, 24 S. W. 737.
The action was brought for the wrongful

killing of the plaintiff's husband under Revised Statutes 1889, §§ 4426 and 4427, which
provided expressly that in assessing the damages, the jury might have regard "to the
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, attending such wrongful act" of the servant,
agent, or employee of the corporation. With some modifications, these are now
Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 5425-5427.
6. See Leahy v. Davis (1893) 121 Mo. 227.
7. McNamarav. St. Louis Transit Co. (1904) 182 Mo. 676,81 S. W. 880; Williams
v. St. Louis, Memphis & S. E. R. R. Co. (1906) 119 Mo. App. 663,96 S. W. 307; Knight
v. Quincy, Omaha & K. C. R. R. Co. (1906) 120 Mo. App. 311, 96 S. W. 716;White
v. Metropolitan St. By. Co. (1908) 132 Mo. App. 339. 112 S. W. 278; Wehmeyer v.
Mulvihill(1910) 150 Mo. App. 197, 130 S. W. 681; Cathey v. St. Louis & San Francisco
R. R. Co. (1910) 149 Mo. App. 134, 130 S. W. 130. See a limitation in these railroad
cases In Boling v. St. Louis & San FranciscoRy. Co. (1905) 189 Mo. 219, 88 S. W. 35;
Glover v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1907) 129 Mo. App. 563, 108 S. W. 105.
8. Ellison, J., in Rouse v. Metropolitan St.R.
Co. (1890) 41 Mo. App. 298, 305.
9. Goddard v. Grand Trunk By. (1869) 57 Me. 202. Quoted with approval by
Gill, J., in his dissent in Rouse v. MetropolitanSt. By. Co. (1890) 41 Mo. App. 298, 314.
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malicious tort of the servant by some act of participation, either by way
of authorization or ratification, or by fault in the employment or retention
0
Many jurisdictions have distinguished between corporaof the servant."
tions and private individuals, holding the former responsible without
any act of participation, on the theory that since a corporation can only
act thru servants their acts axe in fact the acts of the corporation."
2
The recent case of Cook v. Lusk has extended this liability of the
master to the receiver of a railroad. Two hundred and fifty dollars
actual and five hundred dollars punitive damages were recovered from
the federal receiver of the St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad for the
mistreatment of a woman passenger by a conductor. The court affirmed
the judgment without discussing the receiver's liability for punitive
damages. This would seem to indicate either that the point was not
presented by counsel or that the court deemed it unworthy of discussion.
It is urged, however, that this is an unnecessary and unwarrantable
extension of the above-stated doctrine.
A receiver of a railroad is a public officer. He is appointed and directed to act by a court, and does act under its supervision "as an arm
of the court." Except for an injury which is attributable to a personal
act of neglect, ' the fact that he is a public officer shields him from personal
4
responsibility for injuries inflicted in the management of the railroad.'
was
official
capacity
even
in
his
liability
The receiver's compensatory
frequently questioned in the early cases; immunity from such liability
15
was limited in Little v. Dusenberry to "those who are strictly public
officers, who are parts of the governmental agency of the state, entirely
distinct from individual gain or profit, such as state, county, municipal
and township boards and officers, discharging duties imposed upon them
by law, with none behind them but the public, whom they represent,
and no funds to answer for damages except those that must be taken from
the public treasury." Compensatory responsibility is placed upon a
receiver because in conducting his activity he is in the same position as
any other employer and so subject to the principle of respondeat superior.
It is accordingly held without exception that the fact that the defendant
is a receiver, appointed by a court and subject to its supervision, is not a
him in his official capacity for breach of
good defense to an action against
16
duty as a common carrier.
10. Burns v. Campbell (1882) 71 Ala. 271; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Prentica
(1893) 147 U. S. 101; Staples v. Smid (1893) 18 R. I. 224, 26 Atil. 193; Eviston v.
Cramer (1883) 57 Wis. 570, 15 N. W. 760; Haines v. Schultz (1888) 50 N. J. L. 481, 14
Atl. 488; Rowe v. Brooklyn Heights Ry. Co. (1902) 75 N. Y. S. 893, 71 App. Dlv. 474;
Mutual L. I. Co. v. Hargus (1907) 99 S .W. (Tex.) 580; Davis v. Hearst (1911) 160 Cal.
143, 116 Pac. 530. For other cases, see Sedgwick, Damages (9th ed.) § 378.
11. Sedgwick, Damages (9th ed.) § 380, note 229.
12. (1914) 172 S. W. 81.
13. Kirk v. Kane (1901) 87 Mo. App. 274; Erwin v. Davenport (1871) 9 Helsk.
(Tenn.) 44.
14. AveritU v. McCook (1900) 86 Mo. App. 346; Camp v. Barney (1875) 4 Hun
(N. Y.) 373; Cordat v. Barney (1875) 63 N. Y. 281; McNulta v. Ensch (1890) 134 I1.
46; Vasele v. GrantStreet Electric Ry. Co. (1897) 16 Wash. 602, 48 Pac. 249.
15. (1884) 46 N. J. L. 614.
16. Cf. Heath v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. (1884) 83 Mo. 617; Kinney v. Crocker (1864)
18 Wis. 80; Blumenthal v. Brainerd (1866) 38 Vt. 401; Paige v. Smith (1868) 99 Mass.
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Capable of being sued then by a third person for his own or the
negligent act of the servant, the receiver is held to the same degree of

care as the ordinary common carrier. 17
seem to demand this.

Protection to the public would

Tho appointed by a federal court, the law of the

state in which the railroad is operated prevails to determine his liability.' 8
State statutes of a police nature imposing liability upon "railroad com-

panies" 19 and "railroad corporations" 2 0 have been liberally construed so

as to include receivers. This construction has been followed even tho
the statutes are in derogation of the common law.
The language of the cases, however, does go further than to place
merely compensatory liability upon the receiver. In his official capacity
he is said to be "amenable to the same rules of liability that are applicable
to the company when it is operating the road by virtue of the same
franchise."'" But in none of these cases was the question of exemplary
damages before the court for a decision. The entire doctrine of exemplary
damages is based on the notion that it punishes a wrongdoer civilly for
an intentional wrongful act."
This punishment is sought to be inflicted
by the enforced payment of money damages, additional to those that
would compensate for the injury.
It cannot be doubted that this imposition would not accomplish its object unless the funds from which
payment comes, belong to the wrongdoer. The appointment of a receiver
to take charge and manage a railroad, while it does not dissolve the corporation, does displace it. The corporation is ousted from its possession
and control of the assets of the railroad and the receiver is substituted,

whose possession is not that of the corporation,

but of the court

which appointed him.' 3
The corporation cannot be sued for torts com24
mitted by the receiver or his servants in the management of the railroad,
395; Klein v. Jewett (1875) 26 N. J. Eq. 474; Fuller v. Jewett (1880) 80 N. Y. 46;
Winbourne's Case (1886) 30 Fed. 167; Pope's Case (1886) 30 Fed. 169; Brockert v.
Central Iowa By. Co. (1891) 82 Ia. 369, 47 N. W. 1026; Union Paec.By. Co. v. Smith
(1898) 59 Kan. 80, 52 Pac. 102; Louisville So. By. Co. v. Tucker's Adm'r (1899) 105 Ky.
492, 49 S. W. 314.
17. Fullerton v. Fordyce (1893) 121 Mo. 1.
18.
U. S. Compiled Statutes 1913, § 1047; Pierce v. Van Dusen (1897) 78 Fed.
693.
8 93
19. Lamphear v. Buckingham (1886) 33 Coun. 237; Hornsby v. Eddy Q
) 56
Fed. 461, construing a Kansas statute; Pierce v. Van Dusen (1897) 78 4 ed. 693.
construing an Ohio statute. See also Sloan v. Central Iowa By. Co. (1883) 62 Ia. 728;
Texas & Pac. By. Co. v. Cox (1891) 145 W. S. 593, where the federal court of Texas
applied a death statute of Louisiana. Contra, Henderson v. Walker (1875) 55 Ga.
481.
20. Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. By. Co. (1886) 26 Fed. 12, construing a statute of Missouri, Revised Statutes 1879, § 809, now Revised Statutes
1909, § 3145; Powell v. Sherwood (1901) 162 Mo. 605, 63 8. W. 485, construing the
"Fellow-Servant Act," now Revised Statutes 1909, § 5434; Mikkelson v. Truesdale
(1895) 63 Minn. 137, 65 N. W. 260; Hunt v. Conner (1901) 26 Ind. App. 46, 59 N. E.
50.
Contra, Campbell v. McCook (1894) 86 Tex. 630, 26 S. W. 486.
21.
MeNulta v. Lockridge (1891) 137 II. 270, 27 N. E. 452.
See Melendy v.
Barbour (1884) 78 Va. 544, 556, and cases cited In 63 L. R. A. 231.
22. See instructions approved In the following cases: Stoneseifer v. Sheble (1860)
31 Mo. 243; Green v. Craig (1870) 47 Mo. 90; McNamara v. St. Louis Transit Co.
(1904) 182 Mo. 676, 685, 81 S. W. 880; Williams v. St. Louis Memphis & S. E. B. R.
Co. (1906) 119 Mo. App. 663; 96 S. W. 307.
23. High, Receivers (3d ed.) 394; Ohio & Miss. B. B. Co. v. Davis (1864) 23 Ind.
553, 661; Memphis & Little Rock By. Co. v. Stringfellow (1884) 44 Ark. 322; Ohio &
Miss. B. B. Co. v. Anderson (1882) 10 IU. App. 313.
24.
Turner v. Hannibal & St. Joseph B. R. Co. (1881) 74 Mo. 602; Stevens v.
A. T. & S. F. By. Co. (1901) 87 Mo. App. 26; Metz v. Buffalo, etc. R. R. Co. (1874)
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nor without an express assumption of the obligation is it responsible, if it

resumes control, for any liability incurred during the receiver's control.2"

It has already been pointed out that the receiver's liability is an official,
not a personal one. A judgment can be satisfied only from the funds
held by him in his official capacity. 2
The assessment then of exemplary
damages against him either for his own or the tort of his servant, while
it seeks to punish, strikes at property which does not belong to the wrongdoer. Pardee, J., in Pope's Case,2 7 an early federal decision defining the
scope of receivers' responsibility, remarked "altbo as officers of the court,
they may not be liable for punitory or exemplary damages."
It is submitted that to impose liability for exemplary damages upon a receiver is
to lose sight of the object of such damages. It is to be regretted that the

point was not discussed in Cook v. Lusk.
To determine the applicability to receivers of statutes imposing a
penalty upon a "railroad company" or "railroad corporation" involves

merely a question of statutory construction.

The Missouri court held in

Farrell v. Union Trust Co., 28 that "railroad corporations" in a statute
where double damages were provided for the failure to erect fences, gates
and cattle guards, included receivers. Since Boyd v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. 29
and Johnson v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.,3 0 it seems settled

that $2000 of the recovery under the Missouri death statute3 ' is penal.
Whether such a penalty can be recovered against a receiver has not been
decided. By its terms, the statute applies to "corporations, individual or

individuals." Unless these words be deemed a clear expression of legislative intent to include receivers and Farrellv. Union Trust Co. is a binding
analogy, the principles presented in the foregoing analysis should affect

the construction of that statute so as to exclude receivers from the imposition of the penalty.

2

R. BURNETT.
58 N. Y. 61; Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co. v. Anderson (1882) 10 Il1. App. 313; Hicks v.
I. & G. N. Ry. Co. (1884) 62 Tex. 38; Gableman v. Peoria, D. & E. Ry. Co. (1895) 82
Fed. 790; Chamberlainv. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R?. Co. (1897) 71 Fed. 636.
25. Davis v. Duncan (1884) 19 Fed. 477; Godfrey v. Ohio & Al. Ry. Co. (1888)
116 Ind. 30, 18 N. E. 61; M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. McFadden (1896) 89 Tex. 138, 33
S. W. 853.
26. Davis v. Duncan (1884) 19 Fed. 477; McNulta v. Ensch (1890) 134 Ill. 46,
24 N. E. 631: McNulta v. Lockridge (1891) 137 111.270,27 N. E. 452, affirmed in 141 U.
S.327.
27. (1886) 30 Fed. 169.
28. (1883) 77 Mo. 475, construing Revised Statutes 1879, § 809, now Revised
Statutes 1909, § 3145. Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. (1886) 26
Fed. 12, is an interpretation of the same statute. See also Brockert v. Central Iowa
R . Co. (1891) 82 Ia. 369, 47 N. W. 1026.
29. (1913) 249 Mo. 110, 155 S. W.J13.
30. (1913) 174 Mo. App. 16, 160 S. W. 5.
31. Revised Statutes 1909, §§25425-5427.
32. Lamphear v. Buckingham (1866) 33 Conn. 237; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Cox (1891) 145 U. S. 593 (construing a Louisiana statute); Hunt v. Conner (1901) 26
Ind. App. 46, 59 N. E. 50. Each of these cases construed a death statute'to apply
to receivers as well as to corporations. It Is to be noted that the statute in each case
was construed as remedial and compensatory thruout, rather than penal.

